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The aim of this article is twofold. The first aim is to provide a comparative overview of the domestic anti-avoidance rules with specific reference to
Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and Uruguay to evaluate the application of these rules to tackle aggressive tax planning. The second aim is to
assess whether or not the application of general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) in these countries is consistent and clear (transparent) for the
taxpayer. The main argument is that to tackle aggressive tax planning, countries should have GAARs in accordance with the standard of fiscal
transparency as developed in this article (i.e. availability, clarity, simplicity and reliability). Furthermore, the relationship between the taxpayer
and tax administration should be enhanced considering mutual trust, legitimate expectations and respect for the taxpayers’ rights. This article
provides recommendations to enhance the relationship between tax administration and taxpayers to facilitate a coordinated relationship. Such a
coordinated relationship means, on the one hand, that the governments (tax administrations) are provided access to the information regarding the
activities of the taxpayer; and, on the other hand, that taxpayers voluntarily disclose the structure and nature of the economic activities or businesses
in the country.
1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is twofold. The first aim is to
provide a comparative overview of the domestic anti-
avoidance rules with specific reference to Brazil,
Colombia, South Africa and Uruguay to evaluate the
application of these rules to tackle aggressive tax plan-
ning (ATP).1 The second aim is to assess whether or
not the application of general anti-avoidance rules
Notes
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1 See supra n. 1 for the reasoning to choose these countries.
In a nutshell, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay represent three different countries within the sameregion: Brazil as one of the advanced economies in the region with a complex
tax system, Colombia a country with the desire to cooperate but with limited resources, and Uruguay as one of the countries that have been striving to comply with the
OECD standards. South Africa represents one of the most advanced economies in the region, with a fairly sophisticated tax framework and extensive tax treaty network
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(GAARs) in these countries is consistent and clear
(transparent) for the taxpayer. This article considers
the GAAR and not specific anti-avoidance rules
(SAAR), which aim to target specific transactions that
have already been identified as unacceptable tax avoid-
ance or ATP.2
With the aim of protecting a country’s tax base from
erosion, countries have introduced in their domestic law
(i.e. statutory law and/or case law) and in their tax treaties,
rules to tackle tax abuse, unacceptable tax avoidance and
ATP.3 However, countries have not been successful in
countering base erosion and ATP where multinationals
have made use of mismatches between domestic and inter-
national legal rules and there is a lack of a co-ordinated
international approach to base erosion and profit shifting
(BEPS). According to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), multinational
enterprises have been able to significantly minimize
their tax burden through exploitation of tax arbitrage
opportunities and utilization of structures testing the
boundaries of what countries may consider as acceptable
tax planning. The result has been that multinationals have
become more confident in taking aggressive tax
positions.4
In response, the OECD, following the political mandate
of the G-20,5 launched in 2013 the BEPS Project and its
Action Plan.6 The OECD in the BEPS Action Plan called
for ‘fundamental changes to the current mechanisms and
the adoption of new consensus-based approaches,
including anti-abuse provisions, designed to prevent and
counter base erosion and profit shifting’.7
The BEPS Action Plan introduced 15 Actions partly
addressing ATP.8 From these 15 Actions, the OECD
identified Actions 5, 6, 13 and 14 as minimum standards
to be implemented by countries participating in the BEPS
Inclusive Framework.9 The other Actions (1–4, 7–9, and
10–12) are considered best practices and recommenda-
tions for countries to implement. In addition, Action 15
provides for a multilateral convention to implement tax
treaty related measures to prevent BEPS in the existing
network of bilateral tax treaties. At the time of writing
(August 2017), more than seventy countries have signed
the multilateral convention.10 From the countries of
research, all countries are participating in the BEPS
Inclusive Framework and all countries except Brazil have
signed the multilateral convention.11
This article provides, firstly, a comparative overview of
the status quo of the GAARs in the countries of research
before implementation of BEPS. At this stage, it is too
early12 to analyse the implementation of BEPS Actions,
including the BEPS minimum standards, in the selected
countries.13
Following the comparative overview of GAARs in the
countries of research, this article secondly assesses whether
the application of GAARs is consistent and clear (trans-
parent) for the taxpayer. This article argues that to keep
the balance between the need for jurisdictions to enforce
their tax rules and the taxpayer’s right to have certainty in
Notes
2 Examples of specific anti-avoidance rules are thin capitalization rules to limit interest deductions.
3 Examples of these rules in tax treaties are the beneficial ownership, the limitation on benefits test, the main purpose test, the subject to tax clause and the switch over clause
amongst others. At domestic level, countries have introduced GAARs referencing substance over form, business purpose, and abuse of law.
4 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 7–8 (OECD Publishing 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
5 The BEPS and the Action Plan have been endorsed in the G20 meetings at Mexico (June 2012) and St Petersburg (Sept. 2013) respectively. In the G20 meeting in St
Petersburg (Sept. 2013), G20 leaders committed to address base erosion and profit shifting, tackling tax avoidance and promoting transparency and automatic exchange of
information. See in particular, para. 50 of the Declaration, where it has been stated that: ‘In a context of severe fiscal consolidation and social hardship, in many countries
ensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair share of taxes is more than ever a priority. Tax avoidance, harmful practices and aggressive tax planning have to be tackled.’ http://
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
6 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en (accessed 31 Aug. 2017) and OECD, supra n. 4.
7 OECD, supra n. 4, at 13.
8 The Actions considering base erosion and aggressive tax planning are: Action 2 on Hybrid Mismatches, Action 3 on Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules, Action 4 on base
erosion through interest and other financing expenses, Action 5 on Harmful Tax Regimes, Action 6 on Tax Treaty Abuse, Action 8 to 11 on transfer pricing and Action 12
requiring taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements. Other Actions are Action 1 on the Digital Economy, Action 7 on the definition of a permanent
establishment, Action 13 on transfer pricing documentation and, Action 14 addressing the mutual agreement procedure.
9 The BEPS Actions have been adopted by the BEPS 44 Group: OECD, OECD Accession countries and G20. At the Kyoto meeting in June 2016, other countries were
invited to participate in BEPS as BEPS Associates. These countries are now part of the so-called ‘BEPS Inclusive Framework’ and are required to implement the 4 BEPS
Actions identified as minimum standards. At the time of writing (Aug. 2017), more than hundred countries had committed to this BEPS Inclusive Framework. Information
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
10 See for a list of the countries http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
11 For the countries that have not signed the multilateral convention but who are participant of the BEPS inclusive framework (e.g. Brazil), the possibility exists to adopt the
minimum standard (e.g. Action 6) by means of bilateral negotiations. See para. 16 Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention. https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/
explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
12 Therefore, a forthcoming (2019) article in the framework of the DeSTaT project will analyse whether, due to BEPS Actions, new rules have been introduced in the countries
to deal with abusive, aggressive and harmful tax practices and if so whether these rules follow the content of the BEPS Actions.The implementation of BEPS has been the
object of the Seminar 1 at the International Fiscal Association. See S. Shay & A. Christians, General Report, BEPS and Taking Stock Which Focused on the Assessment of BEPS:
Origins, Standards, and Responses vol. 102a (IFA Cahiers, Online Books IBFD 2017).
13 The main reason is that (as of Aug. 2017) the review on the implementation of the BEPS Minimum Standards i.e. Actions 5, 6, 13, and 14 by the countries participating in
the BEPS Inclusive Framework have not yet taken place. The OECD has published the peer review documents including the terms of reference and methodology for peer
reviews all for the BEPS minimum standards. The OECD has also announced that the first standard that will be reviewed and monitored will be Action 14. See http://www.
oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-action-14-peer-review-and-monitoring.htm (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
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the tax rules applicable to their business activities, trans-
parency should be evaluated based on the availability,
clarity, simplicity and reliability of the anti-avoidance
rules. In this framework, the notion of transparency has
a broader meaning than the meaning articulated by the
OECD regarding exchange of information.14
The broader approach to transparency has also been
addressed by several scholars. For Owens, the notion of
transparency should include clarity, simplicity and
reliability.15 Furthermore, Owens states that ‘greater
transparency between the taxpayer and the tax authorities
is a good thing as it will lead to fewer disputes, greater
mutual understanding and a relationship based on coop-
erative compliance’.16 Ring addresses two notions being
transparency and disclosure. Ring states that transparency
includes the understanding by the tax administration of
the taxpayer´s activities and that disclosure requires the
need for a country to have access to the ‘information
necessary to provide transparency regarding the taxpayer’s
activities’.17 Following this broad approach, in this article
it is argued that fiscal transparency requires the drafting
of tax rules that are clear for the tax administration to
enforce and on which the taxpayer may rely. As rightly
pointed out by Schoueri and Barbosa the notion of trans-
parency ‘should be extended to the state itself and to
covering the tax system as a whole’.18
The main argument of this article is that to tackle
ATP, countries should have GAARs in accordance with
the standard of fiscal transparency as developed in this
article (i.e. availability, clarity, simplicity and reliability).
Furthermore, the relationship between the taxpayer and
tax administration should be enhanced considering
mutual trust, legitimate expectations and respect for the
taxpayers’ rights.
Following the argument for an enhanced relationship
between taxpayers and tax authorities, this article, finally,
provides recommendations to enhance the relationship
between tax administration and taxpayers to facilitate a
coordinated instead of an adversarial position. Such a
coordinated relationship means, on the one hand, that
the governments (tax administrations) are provided access
to the information regarding the activities of the taxpayer;
and, on the other hand, that taxpayers voluntarily disclose
the structure and nature of the economic activities or
businesses in the country.
This article is structured as follows: section 2 intro-
duces tax avoidance and ATP. Section 3 provides the
comparative analysis of the anti-avoidance rules in the
surveyed countries. Section 4 addresses the use of
exchange of information to tackle ATP in the surveyed
countries. Section 5 addresses the enhanced relationship
between taxpayer and tax administration in the surveyed
countries. Section 6 concludes as to whether the measures
taken by the surveyed countries are consistent with the
standard of fiscal transparency including availability,
clarity, simplicity and reliability of the anti-avoidance
rules and the development of enhanced relationships
between the tax administrations and taxpayers and pro-
vides recommendations.
2 TAX AVOIDANCE AND AGGRESSIVE TAX
PLANNING
2.1 Tax Avoidance
Countries appear to have a common understanding of the
distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance.19
International organizations (IOs) such as the OECD state
that ‘tax evasion’ is a term that is difficult to define but
which is generally used to mean illegal arrangements
where liability to tax is hidden or ignored, i.e. the tax-
payer pays less tax than he is legally obligated to pay by
hiding income or information from the tax authorities.
Tax avoidance has been defined by the OECD stating that
it is ‘a term that is difficult to define but which is
generally used to describe the arrangement of a taxpayer’s
affairs that is intended to reduce his tax liability and that
although the arrangement could be strictly legal it is
usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it
purports to follow’.20 However, the distinction between
‘acceptable tax avoidance’ and ‘unacceptable tax avoidance’
Notes
14 A standard of transparency and exchange of information has been developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its 2010 Tax
Treaty Model and in the 2002 Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters. This standard requires exchange of ‘foreseeable relevant’ information, respect
for taxpayers’ rights including right to confidentiality, removal of bank secrecy, the availability of reliable information, and the powers by the country (tax administration) to
obtain such information. Global Forum Terms of Reference (Nov. 2013). Background Brief. Annex I, at 6, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/global_forum_background
%20brief.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
15 J. Owens, Moving Towards Better Transparency and Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, Vol. 63 (11) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 557 (2009).
16 J. Owens, International Tax Transparency: The ‘Full Monty’, Vol. 68 (9) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 384 (2014). The topic of co-operative compliance will be dealt with in other articles
in the framework of the DeSTaT project.
17 D. Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base in Developing Countries (United Nations Sept. 2014), Retrievable at the following link:
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2014TBP2/Paper_TransparencyDisclosure.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
18 For Schoueri and Barbosa transparency ‘should be used as mechanism for the creation of a mature relationship between state and citizen, and the result is that taxpayers feel
part of the community and therefore involved in the process of granting states the means for their activities’. L. E. Schoueri & M. C. Barbosa, Transparency: From Tax Secrecy to
the Simplicity and Reliability of the Tax System, 5 Brit. Tax Rev. 677–678 (2013).
19 For a definition of tax evasion and tax avoidance and their boundaries see V. Uckmar, General Report, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion vol. 68a, 20–23 (IFA Cahiers, Online
Books IBFD 1983).
20 OECD, Glossary of Terms, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
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is far less clear. As rightly argued by Arnold and Wilson,
‘the problem is drawing a line between “acceptable” tax
avoidance and “unacceptable” tax avoidance – to balance
taxpayers’ need for a reasonable degree of certainty and
predictability in planning their affairs and the govern-
ment’s need to protect its tax base’.21
In general, the approach towards the boundaries
between accepted (legally effective) and unaccepted tax
avoidance (obtaining benefits not intended by the legis-
lator and legally ineffective due to the use of anti-avoid-
ance doctrines) is followed by countries around the
world.22 Tax scholars have also addressed the distinction
between acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance. For
instance, Thuronyi classifies this as tax minimization and
tax avoidance, but with the same features that correspond
to acceptable tax avoidance and unacceptable tax avoid-
ance. For Thuronyi, tax minimization (acceptable tax
avoidance) is a ‘behaviour that is legally effective in redu-
cing tax liability’. Tax avoidance for Thuronyi (being
unacceptable tax avoidance) has the same aim (i.e. reduc-
tion of tax liability) but ‘that is found to be legally
ineffective (perhaps because of an anti-abuse doctrine or
by construction of the tax law) although it does not
constitute a criminal offense’.23
While there may be consensus as to the broad concep-
tualization of tax evasion, acceptable tax avoidance and
unacceptable tax avoidance, there are differences in the
rules used by countries to tackle tax avoidance. In the
2002 International Fiscal Association (IFA) report, the
general reporter classified the rules on tax avoidance
articulated in the national reports into three categories:
(1) neither statute-based nor court based general measures;
(2) a statute-based general tax avoidance rule; and (3)
court-based general tax avoidance rule(s).24 From the ana-
lysis of the twenty-seven national reports at that time
(2002), the general reporter concluded that ‘there is a
significant trend in the direction of more statute-based
rules coming into effect’.25
Similarly, in the 2010 IFA report,26 forty-four national
reports provided an overview of the anti-avoidance doc-
trines and provisions with an international scope. From
the analysis, the general reporter stated that ‘the branch
reports establish that most countries have either statutory
or court developed anti-avoidance rules. The nature and
scope of these rules differ considerably from country to
country. The doctrines can be summarised as sham, leg-
ally ineffective transactions, substance over form, abuse of
law, fraus legis, or simply as the general anti-avoidance
rule (GAAR)’.27 The differences in approach to the nature
and scope of these rules is also demonstrated in the
comparative overview of the GAARs in the surveyed
countries (see section 3 below).
2.2 Aggressive Tax Planning
In the last decade, IOs such as the OECD and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)28 have referred to
‘aggressive tax planning’, a phrase without a legal defini-
tion, to introduce the concept of ‘fair share of taxes’ when
considering tax structures employed by multinational
enterprises (in the main) and perhaps expanding the con-
sensus of ‘unacceptable tax avoidance’.29 The OECD has
stated that tax avoidance is ‘a term that is difficult to
define but which is generally used to describe the arrange-
ment of a taxpayer’s affairs that is intended to reduce his
tax liability and that although the arrangement could be
strictly legal it is usually in contradiction with the intent
of the law it purports to follow’.30
Furthermore, in 2008, the OECD published a Study
into the Role of Tax Intermediaries and their engagement
in ATP.31 In this Study, the OECD referred to ATP
without providing a specific or clear definition.
However, the Glossary stated that ATP refers to (1) plan-
ning involving a tax position that is tenable but has
unintended and unexpected tax revenue consequences
and (2) taking a tax position that is favourable to the
Notes
21 B. Arnold & J. Wilson, Aggressive International Tax Planning by Multinational Corporations: The Canadian Context and Possible Responses (2 Oct. 2014). SPP Research Paper No.
07.29 at 16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510950 (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
22 For an overview of tax avoidance in twenty-two countries see F. Zimmer, General Report, Form and Substance in Tax Law vol. 87a, 37–50 (IFA Cahiers, Online Books IBFD
2002).
23 V. Thuronyi et al., Comparative Tax Law Ch. 5 (2d ed., Kluwer Law International 2016).
24 F. Zimmer, supra n. 22, at 37–38.
25 Ibid., at 38. The GAARs will be discussed in the 2018 IFA Seoul Congress. Subject 1 which deals with Anti-avoidance measures of general nature and scope. GAAR and
other rules.
26 See S. van Weeghel, General Report, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti-Avoidance Provisions vol. 95a (IFA Cahiers, Online Books IBFD 2010).
27 Ibid., at 22.
28 Gribnau has further elaborated the concept of fairness stating that the discussion of NGO’s has also brought a new dimension to the concept of fairness mainly calling for
taxpayers to pay fair share taxes not only as required by law, but also as expected from society. See Hans Gribnau & Ave-Geidi Jallai, Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral
Responsibility and Transparency, Vol. 1 (1) Nordic Tax J. 70–88 (12 May 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3021914 (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
29 For a discussion of the use of fairness by IOs, NGOs, SOs and governments in respect of developing countries. See I. Burgers & I. Mosquera, Corporate Taxation and BEPS: A
Fair Slice for Developing Countries?, (8) Erasmus L. Rev. 29–47 (2017). DOI: 10.5553/ELR.000077 (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
30 OECD, supra n. 20.
31 Tax intermediaries is a collective term used by the OECD for tax advisers and financial institutions. See OECD, Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (2008). Glossary at 88,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/studyintotheroleoftaxintermediaries.htm#table (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
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taxpayer without openly disclosing that there is uncer-
tainty whether significant matters in the tax return accord
with the law. The Study furthers elaborates that the first
situation may result in ‘tax legislation being misused to
achieve results which were not foreseen by the legislators’.
The second situation addresses the concern of revenue
bodies ‘to the risk that taxpayers will not disclose their
view on the uncertainty or risk taking in relation to grey
areas of law (sometimes, revenue bodies would not even
agree that the law is in doubt)’.32
The term ATP without a clear definition has been also
used by the OECD in the BEPS Action Plan when
referring to tax practices resulting in BEPS by
multinationals.33 In the BEPS Action Plan, the OECD
stated that ATP has reduced the tax burden of multi-
nationals leading ‘to a tense situation in which citizens
have become more sensitive to tax fairness issues’.34
NGOs such as Tax Justice Network stated in 2014:
in a highly globalised world dominated by large multi-
national corporations, it is essential to ensure that taxes
are paid where the true economic activity occurs. Under
current global rules, this is often not the case, and
companies are able to shift profits around the globe to
places where they will be taxed less. This has a parti-
cularly devastating impact on developing countries.35
Finally, tax schemes used by companies in general and by
high net worth individuals have been also addressed as
ATP mainly by countries and NGOs.36
Unlike the OECD, the European Union has defined
ATP in the European Commission Recommendation of
6 December 2012 on ATP C (2012) 8806 Final (the
‘2012 Recommendation’). The European Commission sta-
ted in the 2012 Recommendation that ‘aggressive tax
planning consists in taking advantage of the technicalities
of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax
systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability’.37
However, this definition has been only provided by the
EU in a non-binding (recommendation) instrument,
therefore EU countries are not required to introduce this
definition into their domestic law. Certainly, non-EU
countries (third countries) are not bound by this EU
definition.
The 2016 Tax Avoidance Package, including the Anti-
Avoidance Directive (ATAD 1), made reference to the
2012 Recommendation definition of ATP, but fell short
of endorsing it. The Tax Avoidance package provides for
‘concrete measures to prevent aggressive tax planning, to
boost transparency and create a level playing field for all
business in the EU’.38 Neither the text of ATAD 1 (for
EU countries) nor the text of ATAD 2 (for third (non-EU)
countries) contain a definition of ATP resulting in a
potential lack of coherence or inconsistency on introduc-
tion of the ATAD 1 and ATAD 2 by EU countries into
their domestic legislation i.e. by 31 December 2018 and
by 1 January 2020 ATAD 2.39
The boundaries between ATP and tax abuse have also
been addressed by some tax scholars. For instance,
Pistone argues that ATP is a new conceptual category
of global tax law. It consists in the exploitation of cross-
border disparities across tax systems with a view to
achieving tax advantages that States would otherwise
not have meant to give. Therefore, ATP should be dif-
ferentiated from tax abuse and tax avoidance.40 As
rightly stated by Pistone abusive tax avoidance reflects
purely artificial transactions lacking valid economic sub-
stance whereas ATP is not abusive, rather it is the result
of the misalignment between taxing powers and value
creation.41
Notes
32 Ibid., at 87.
33 In the BEPS Action Plan, the OECD stated that aggressive tax planning has reduced the tax burden of multinationals leading ‘to a tense situation in which citizens have
become more sensitive to tax fairness issues’, OECD, supra n. 4, at 8.
34 OECD, supra n. 4, at 8.
35 See (17 Oct. 2014), http://www.taxjustice.net/2014/10/17/fair-taxes-key-fair-share/ (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
36 Some examples are for instance the reports of the Tax Justice Network on Offshore Finance and Tax havens and the publication of Panama Papers and Bahama Papers that
have also resulted in more discussion regarding the use of offshore tax structures.
37 European Commission Recommendation of 6 Dec. 2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning C (2012) 8806 Final at 2.
38 See EU Commission Website for anti-avoidance package at, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/anti_tax_avoidance/index_en.htm (accessed 31 Aug.
2017).
39 Neither in the text of the Proposal for the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) or the text of the ATAD 1 provide in the Art. 2 of definitions for a definition of aggressive
tax planning. Crf. Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market COM/2016/
026 final – 2016/011 (CNS). For ATAD 1, see the text of the adopted Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices
that directly affect the functioning of the internal market. OJ L 193, 19 July 2016. For ATAD 2, see the text of adopted by the Council Directive amending Directive (EU)
2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries dated 12 May 2017. See the text of the http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6661-2017-INIT/
en/pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
40 P. Pistone, La planificación fiscal agresiva y las categorías conceptuales del Derecho tributario global, Revista Española de Derecho Financiero 170 (Apr.–June 2016).
41 According to Pistone, tax avoidance has three elements: (1) friction between form and substance to obtain tax advantage; (2) purely artificial transactions lacking valid
economic reasons and (3) the intention to avoid tax duly reflected in objective elements. Furthermore, Pistone argues that aggressive tax planning differs from tax avoidance
since the former entails three different elements: (1) the exploitation of cross-border tax disparities to obtain bilateral tax advantages; (2) misalignment between taxing
powers and value creation and (3) unintended tax advantages from double non-taxation. Chapter 4: The Meaning of Tax Avoidance and Aggressive Tax Planning in European Union




Another tax scholar, Piantavigna examined the bound-
aries between tax abuse and ATP. Included in his scope of
tax abuse are transactions where the tax benefit is within
the boundaries of the rules, but not in accordance with the
object and purpose of the rules. He adds that, unlike tax
abuse, ‘Aggressive tax planners do not go beyond the
limits fixed by rules, they go between rules (i.e. ‘inter
leges’). This gives rise to ‘aggressive’ tax planning, which
consists of exploiting gaps in the architecture of the
existing tax legislations, mismatches and disparities (i.e.
differences resulting from the concurrent exercise of two
or more taxing jurisdictions) of the international tax
system. ATP reveals its essential nature of ‘arranging’,
‘organizing’, ‘placing’ (‘planning’, precisely) for tax pur-
poses. It consists of active purposive behaviour (as opposed
to passive unintentional behaviour), as ‘[m]aking mistakes
because of ignorance of tax rules is very different from
aggressive tax planning and tax fraud’.42
To test these issues, the comparative overview below
aims to, firstly, examine the GAARs introduced in the
countries of research and, secondly, how the GAARs in
these countries have been used, if at all, to tackle ATP
(section 3). The findings from this overview will support
the discussion as to whether the use and implementation
of these GAARs has provided certainty and clarity to the
taxpayer and tax administration (section 4).
3 RULES APPLICABLE TO AGGRESSIVE TAX
PLANNING IN THE SURVEYED COUNTRIES
3.1 Domestic General Anti-Avoidance Rules
(GAARs)
3.1.1 GAARs in the Surveyed Countries
All surveyed countries have included or are in the process
of including GAARs in their statutory laws. Colombia,
Uruguay and South Africa have existing GAARs.
Brazil is still in the process of including a statutory-
based GAAR. In Brazil, Complementary Law No. 104
(enacted on 10 January 2001) introduced an additional
paragraph to Article 116 of the Tax Code, a GAAR to
address sham/simulated transactions. The provision
required the procedure to apply this GAAR to be estab-
lished by ordinary law. To this end, Provisional Measure
No. 66 in 2002 was introduced, but as this Measure also
added concepts such as business purpose and abuse of form
that were beyond the scope of the sham doctrine, this
Provisional Measure was rejected by the Parliament.43
Until the relevant regulatory measures are introduced
(which at August 2017 had not yet occurred), the
Brazilian GAAR remains inapplicable.44
In Colombia, before 2012, the doctrine of simulation, as
provided in private law, was made applicable to taxation
with little success, as the application required the prior
declaration of the existence of a simulated legal act by a
civil court.45 Since the tax reform of 2012, two specific
doctrines i.e. abuse of law and substance over form46 have
been introduced in the Tax Code in the form of a GAAR
(Article 869). Uruguay introduced the substance over form
doctrine in the Tax Code (Article 6(2)).
South Africa has several rules and principles in the
Income Tax Law, Tax Administration Act and case law
to mitigate against tax avoidance. The statutory GAAR in
the Income Tax Act considers any arrangement resulting
in a tax benefit as potentially an avoidance arrangement.
To be classified as an impermissible avoidance arrange-
ment, the transaction must have any one of a number of
avoidance characteristics, such as result in misuse or abuse
of the provisions of the Income Tax Act; create rights or
obligations not normally found in transactions between
persons acting at arm’s length; in a business context was
entered into or carried out in a manner or means not
normally employed for business purposes (other than to
obtain a tax benefit) or lacks commercial substance. Apart
from this statutory test, the South African courts can also
use common law legal principles to counter tax avoidance,
such as the test for a simulated transaction or substance
over form.47 Moreover, the South African Tax
Administration Act provides for ‘Reportable
Arrangements’, which aims to tackle potentially ATP
arrangements as identified by the tax administration.
Notes
42 P. Piantavigna, Tax Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning in the BEPS Era: How EU Law and the OECD Are Establishing a Unifying Conceptual Framework in International Tax Law,
Despite Linguistic Discrepancies, 9 World Tax J. (2017).
43 According to L. E. Schoueri & R. A. Galendi, provisional Measure No. 66 was enacted by the Government in 2002 with the purpose of fulfilling ‘the requirement set forth
by the sole paragraph of Article 116 of the National Tax Code’. In its Arts 13 to 19, this provisional statute provided for situations in which the administrative authority
could disregard legal acts or transactions carried out by the taxpayer. Such provisions, allegedly consistent with the concepts set forth in countries that have successfully
regulated tax avoidance, were aimed at situations that, ‘whilst licit, pursue a more favourable tax regime and involve abuse of forms or lack of business purpose’. Art. 14 of
Provisional Measure No. 66 included expressions such as ‘lack of business purpose’ (defined as the ‘option for a more complex or more expensive form, between two or more
forms available for the taxpayer’) and ‘abuse of forms’ (described by the statute as ‘the indirect act which produces the same economic result as the dissimulated act or legal
transaction’). L. E. Schoueri & R. A. Galendi Junior, Chapter 9: Brazil, in Tax Avoidance Revisited in the EU BEPS Context 203 (A. P. Dourado ed., IBFD 2017).
44 Ibid., at s. II.2.
45 Paniagua and Mayorga stated that in ‘civil law, simulation occurs when a contract is established containing statements or declarations which conceal the true intent of the
parties while constituting a seemingly valid legal form’. .J. Paniagua-Lozano and H. Mayorga-Arango, Colombia, Form and Substance in Tax Law, in Cahiers de droit Fiscal
International. International Fiscal Association, Vol. 87a, 217 (The Hague: SDU, 2002).
46 These rules were introduced by means of Law 1607 of 2012. See for an overview of the Law 1607, I. Mosquera Valderrama, Sweeping Tax Reforms Take Effect, Tax Notes Int’l
433 (4 Feb. 2013).
47 See C. West & J. Roeleveld, Chapter 24: South Africa, in Tax Avoidance Revisited in the EU BEPS Context 617 (A. P. Dourado ed., IBFD 2017).
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One important difference in the application of these
doctrines is that the analysis of the legal substance (sham/
simulation) versus economic substance ((business purpose,
substance over form) may result in different outcomes on
the application of these doctrines to artificial transactions.
For instance, the sham/simulation (legal approach) doc-
trine aims to apply the actual legal reality and not the
constructed legal reality of the taxpayer.48 In contrast,
applying the substance over form or the business purpose
doctrine to the transaction may result in re-characteriza-
tion of the transaction or one element of the transaction
by the tax administration to give effect to the substance
and purpose of the transaction.49
In addition to the differences in the application of these
doctrines, in general, as rightly stated by the 2002 IFA
General Report, the application of the anti-avoidance
rules may be the result of the difference between common
law and civil law countries, for instance in respect of fraus
legis for civil law countries and substance over form for
common law countries.50 Furthermore, the 2002 IFA
General Report also stated that in common law countries
such as the United States, a separate number of doctrines
exist side by side: the ‘step transaction’ doctrine, the
‘business purpose’ doctrine, the ‘substance over form’ doc-
trine, the ‘economic substance’ or ‘economic sham’
doctrine.51
However, this distinction between common law and
civil law is not applicable in Brazil, Colombia or
Uruguay. Colombia and Uruguay, despite being civil
law countries, make use of a substance over form rule. In
Colombia, use of this rule is complementary to the abuse
of law rule, giving greater strength to the anti-avoidance
tools available to the tax administration. For Uruguay, the
substance over form rule is treated as the main rule. In
Brazil despite being a civil law country, the tax adminis-
tration has introduced in practice the business purpose
doctrine mainly due to the impossibility to apply the
statutory Brazilian GAAR rule of sham/simulation. The
description of the implementation of these rules by the
countries of research is provided in section 3.1.2 below.
3.1.2 Implementation of the GAARs
While these broad anti-avoidance rules in each of the
surveyed countries would appear to have the potential to
be far-reaching in preventing tax avoidance, their imple-
mentation appears problematic. Implementation problems
have the immediate effect of producing uncertainty and a
lack of clarity for the taxpayer as to the scope of the
GAAR and how the tax administration and/or judiciary
will implement it.
In Brazil, even though the doctrine of sham/simulation
was introduced in Complementary Law No. 104 (enacted
on 10 January 2001), the regulation given it effect is not
yet in force. However, in practice the tax administration
and the Brazilian Administrative Council of Tax Appeals
(Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais CARF) have used
the business purpose doctrine without any article in the
Tax Code or in case law justifying its use.52 This ‘business
purpose doctrine’ was developed in common law legal
systems, which does not fit in the civil law system of
Brazil. In addition, this doctrine is more difficult to
implement than the sham/simulation doctrine since not
only the business itself, but also the purpose of the busi-
ness, plays a role in determining whether the transaction
should be re-characterized as unacceptable tax avoidance
or ATP.53
Notes
48 The 2002 general reporter addressed sham/simulated transactions stated with respect to these transactions, ‘the core of the concept is that the form which a legal relation is
given does not cover the reality intended by the parties. As often defined in civil law codes, the concept of sham/simulation covers two main situations: in the first one, there
is no reality at all and in the second one, the simulated transaction covers another, hidden, transaction or relationship’. Zimmer, supra n. 22, at 29.
49 For instance, in South Africa, if the GAAR is applicable the South African Revenue Service (SARS) ‘may (i) disregard, combine or recharacterize the arrangement or any step
thereof; (ii) disregard any accommodating or tax-indifferent party or treat this party and any other party as one and the same person; (iii) determine the parties who are
connected persons in respect of each other as one and the same person; (iv) reallocate any income or expenditure between the parties; (v) recharacterize any income of a capital
nature as income of a revenue nature; (vi) treat the transaction as if it has not been carried out, or in any other manner that in the SARS’s view is adequate for the prevention
or disminution of the tax benefit’. P. J. Hattingh, South Africa – Corporate Taxation s. 7, Country Surveys IBFD (https://online.ibfd.org/document/gtha_za_s_7 accessed 31
Aug. 2017).
50 In this regard, the 2002 IFA General Report stated that ‘in many civil law countries, written or unwritten tax avoidance rules have their roots in the Roman law concept of
dispositions in fraudem legis’. The 2002 IFA General Report also stated that ‘In common law countries, there is no fraus legis doctrine with Roman law roots. Instead, a
concept of substance over form and other doctrines has emerged in the USA’. Zimmer, supra n. 22, at 42–43.
51 According to the 2002 IFA General Report ‘The relation between them is not clear. Certainly, they overlap each other to a large extent and it is common for the tax
authorities to invoke as many of them as possible in the specific case, in order to make it possible for the court to “choose from the cafeteria of tax avoidance doctrines”, as the
branch reporters put it’. Zimmer, supra n. 22, at 43.
52 So it happened in the Lupatech case (Judgment 1402-001.404 of 7 Sept. 2013), where the Brazilian Administrative Council of Tax Appeals (Conselho Administrativo de
Recursos Fiscais CARF) found that ‘the acts carried out are licit and coherent with the private law’, but disregarded the transaction by considering it ‘artificial’ due to ‘the lack
of business purpose’. Other judgments indicate that the BRS has been applying tests of substance in connection with the business purpose doctrine to disregard the tax
effects of formal holding or trading companies. Authorities underline the absence of staff, equipment and premises of the relevant company, as if positive activities were
required for legal entities to fulfil their purposes. The approach is adopted even when the structure is compliant with specific anti-avoidance rules. In the Marcopolo case
(Judgments 105-17.083 and 105-17.084 of 25 June 2008), the CARF disregarded trading companies in view of the lack of ‘operational capacity able to perform the
activities to which they were assigned’, notwithstanding the transfer pricing control by the taxpayer.
53 The Carrefour case (Judgment 103-23.290, of 12 May 2007) demonstrates that the Brazilian Administrative Council of Tax Appeals (Conselho Administrativo de Recursos
Fiscais CARF) is even prepared to distort the sham doctrine as means to enforce the business purpose argument: the decision was reasoned on ‘the absence of any business or
corporate purpose in the merger undertaken’, but eventually concluded that ‘the case should be qualified as sham’. The misuse of intricate doctrines and its consequences on
legal certainty and equality, considered central to the rule of law, are discussed by Schoueri and Barbosa. It is felt from decisions in Brazil that authorities have a priori
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The interpretation of the business purpose doctrine by
the Brazilian Administrative Council of Tax Appeals
(Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais CARF) has raised
uncertainty with respect to the position of the taxpayer. In
2016, Schoueri and Galendi stated that there is a ‘move-
ment of the court towards a “substance over form”
approach, whereby doctrines such as “business purpose”
and “abuse of law” began to be invoked by the judges to
disregard transactions undertaken by the taxpayer in which
no other reason than the tax reduction could be found’. The
report, when analysing the CARF’s approach, also con-
cluded that notwithstanding the lack of regulation in
Brazilian law, the business purpose argument has been
‘taken into account by CARF, sometimes under the label
of sham sometimes with no legal basis at all’.54 Such
application has created uncertainty for taxpayers in their
transactions since the decisions of the CARF do not reflect
a co-ordinated or consistent approach – in some cases
transactions considered as sham will be tackled under the
business purpose, and in other cases the business purpose is
applied even if the transaction is not regarded as a sham.55
The abuse of law and the substance over form doctrines
were introduced into the Colombian Tax Code in 2012
(modified in 2016).56 Abuse for tax purposes is the use or
implementation, by means of one operation or a set of
operations of any entity, legal act or procedure that aims
to change, disguise or modify artificially the tax conse-
quences that will be generated for the taxpayer or related
parties, shareholders, or real beneficiaries. The tax reform
enacted in December 2016, explicitly removes the inten-
tion to defraud as an element of abuse, leaving only the
burden of demonstrating the artificial form for the transac-
tion and the tax advantage obtained by the taxpayer.
Article 869-1 of the Colombian Tax Code has now sub-
stituted the criteria for the presumption of abuse of law ((1)
the transaction is between related parties; (2) the transac-
tion makes use of tax havens; (3) the transaction includes a
special entities regime or an exempt tax entity; (4) the price
agreed differs by more than 25% from the arm’s length
price; (5) the conditions agreed by the parties would have
not been agreed by third parties in similar circumstances.-
57) for a rather flexible procedure that only requires the tax
authorities to indicate the reasons why they believe a
transaction is abusive with mere preliminary evidence. In
all cases of abuse, the burden of proof to disprove abuse
rests on the taxpayer, once the tax authorities have indi-
cated why they suspect the presence of abuse.
The 2012 Tax Reform in Colombia also introduced the
following factors indicative of abuse for tax purposes (1)
presence of one or more transactions (step-transaction
doctrine); (2) artificial alteration or modification of tax
effects; (3) one or more taxpayers and their related parties,
shareholders, partners or beneficial owners; (4) intention
to obtain a tax advantage; and (5) absence of a main,
legitimate and reasonable business purpose. These, how-
ever, were removed from the tax code with the 2016 tax
reform, probably with the intention of freeing the tax
administration from the requirement of fitting the tax-
payer conduct into a structured theory of abuse. This
decision, of course, had a large negative impact on legal
certainty, as taxpayers cannot know the criteria that the
tax administration will use to determine if a structure or
transaction is artificial or abusive.
While there are no public cases documenting the appli-
cation of the GAAR to any transaction, several aspects in
the application of the Colombian GAAR are problematic
including: the lack of business knowledge by tax adminis-
tration officials in charge of re-characterization; the uncer-
tainty produced by the definition of the most ‘natural’ legal
form to achieve a business purpose; the difficulties in
establishing a fair market value and the possible differences
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
thirteen valuations;58 and the uncertainty as to whether
the courts will produce their own jurisprudence on what
constitutes an artificial arrangement.
Article 6(2) of the Tax Code in Uruguay provides for
the substance over form doctrine. However, it is not
clear whether the application of the anti-abuse rule is
aimed at tackling only tax avoidance or also tax evasion.
In practice, the tax administration has used this rule as
an anti-evasion clause. These rules are not specifically
applicable to ATP since the main element for the
application of the anti-avoidance rule is whether the
behaviour of the taxpayer implies the use of an inap-
propriate legal form. The inappropriate legal form may
not of itself be indicative of ATP.
Notes
judgment over certain tax planning structures and the business purpose doctrine is fit to give grounds to virtually any challenge, in a growing insecurity for taxpayers. L. E.
Schoueri & M. C. Barbosa, Chapter 6: Brazil, in GAARs – A Key Element of Tax Systems in the Post-BEPS World 109–145 (M. Lang et al., Amsterdam: IBFD 2016).
54 L. E. Schoueri & R. A. Galendi Junior, Brazil Section II.3. addressed the approach of the Brazilian Administrative Council of Tax Appeals (Conselho Administrativo de Recursos
Fiscais CARF) towards tax planning. This report stated that despite the decisions of the CARF lacking legal basis, the taxpayer does not go to the judiciary to annul the
decisions of the CARF. One of the reasons could be the REFIS programme (Programa de Recuperação Fiscal) aiming to pay the tax debts in instalments. To participate in the
REFIS programme, the taxpayer is required to waive the right to appeal to the Judiciary. Schoueri & Galendi Junior, supra n. 43, at 209.
55 S. 9.2.3.1. Schoueri & Galendi Junior, supra n. 43, at 205–207.
56 Arts 869, 869-1 and 869-2) Law 1607 of 2012 modified by means of Art. 300 of the Law 1819 of 2016.
57 Mosquera Valderrama, supra n. 46.
58 International Financial Reporting Standard 13 Fair Value Measurement ‘applies to IFRSs that require or permit fair value measurements or disclosures and provides a single
IFRS framework for measuring fair value and requires disclosures about fair value measurement. The Standard defines fair value on the basis of an “exit price” notion and uses
a “fair value hierarchy”, which results in a market-based, rather than entity-specific, measurement’. https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs13 (accessed 31 Aug.
2017).
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South Africa introduced a new GAAR in 2006 (section
80A to 80 L of the Income Tax Act59). This GAAR
replaced the old GAAR (section 103(1) of the Income
Tax Act60). While the old GAAR was supported by case
law, no cases have been heard with respect to the applica-
tion of the new GAAR. However, as many of the princi-
ples of the old GAAR were retained in the new GAAR,
the case law regarding the old GAAR61 remains applic-
able in many instances ‘to answer selected aspects with
respect to the application of the statutory rules or clarifies
the court’s position on the application of the common law
doctrines’.62
The current GAAR of section 80A of the Income Tax
Act provides that an impermissible tax avoidance arrange-
ment is one if its main purpose is to obtain a tax benefit
and is abnormal, or lacks commercial substance, or creates
rights and obligations which are not arms-length. The
current rule applies to any arrangement entered into on
or after 2 November 2006. The tax authorities have been
slow to challenge a taxpayer under the new anti-abuse rule
instead, the tax authorities have chosen to introduce spe-
cific legislation to tackle tax avoidance. This may be based
on a view of the GAAR as a deterrent instead of an active
rule. In addition to the statutory GAAR, additional com-
mon law principles may be applied to counter tax avoid-
ance. These principles apply in cases where there is, for
example, a simulated transaction.
3.2 Application of GAARs to Aggressive Tax
Planning
3.2.1 Aggressive Tax Planning Schemes
and Application of GAARs
For this article, it is first questioned whether the GAARs,
where existing in the surveyed countries, are useable for
ATP as described by Pistone and Piantavigna.63 Secondly,
in examining the use of GAARs to prevent or mitigate
ATP, has such use resulted in more uncertainty for tax-
payers and tax administrations on what constitutes ATP
and the circumstances under which it becomes unaccep-
table tax avoidance?
The research in section 3.1 shows that there is not
clarity on whether the GAARs can be used against ATP.
The research shows that no distinction between tax
avoidance, tax abuse and ATP appears in the legislation
of the surveyed countries. The existence of a statutory-
based rule, such as a GAAR or the anti-avoidance judge-
made doctrine may imply that the country has tools
necessary to defend against ATP, tax abuse and/or tax
avoidance in some measure. Certainly, the statutory
GAAR and judge-made doctrine include the ability to
tackle artificiality within an activity/transaction that
may have resulted from either unacceptable tax avoid-
ance or ATP.
The research in section 3.1 shows that from a tax policy
perspective the countries have struggled to find the right
balance between the introduction of tax measures to tackle
ATP and the introduction of transparent measures that
provide clarity and reliability for the taxpayer.
It is important that countries establish common bound-
aries between unacceptable tax avoidance and ATP to
harmonize, and possible expand, the application of the
GAARs to these two concepts. This expansion may result
in an additional tool to tackle ATP as a whole even
beyond the boundaries of tax avoidance as currently con-
templated by the countries of research.64
In respect of ATP, the focus has been in the use of tax
schemes to deal with the use of low tax jurisdictions; or
the use of tax treaties (treaty shopping) with less restric-
tive treaty abuse provisions.65 In addition, of the countries
of research (Brazil and South Africa) have also made dis-
tinctions regarding ATP by individuals and/or corporate
(small or large corporations).
For instance, the Brazilian tax authority focusses more
on companies with respect to tax avoidance than
Notes
59 Ss 80A to 80L defines an impermissible avoidance arrangement as any arrangement that meet the following four requirements: (1) an avoidance arrangement (as defined) is
entered into or carried out; (2) it results in a tax benefit; (3) any one of the following ‘tainted elements’ is present (a) abnormality regarding means, manners, rights or
obligations; (b) a lack of commercial substance in whole or in part; (c) misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act; (4) the sole or main purpose is to obtain a tax benefit. L.
van Schalkwyk & B. Geldenhuys, Section 80A (c) (ii) of the Income Tax Act and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes in South Africa, 17(2) Meditari Acct. Res. 167–168 (2009).
60 S. 103(1) stated the old general anti-avoidance rule. For a transaction to fall under s. 103(1), the transaction will be evaluated in accordance to the following criteria: (1) there
has to be a transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out; (2) the effect of the transaction is avoiding or postponing or reducing the liability for the payment of
any tax imposed by the Act; (3) the abnormality test or arm’s length test under a transaction, operation or scheme; and (4) the transaction must have been entered into solely
or mainly for the purposes of avoiding, postponing or reducing the amount of tax liability. J. C. Kanamugire, A Critical Analysis of Tax Avoidance in the South African Income
Tax Act 58 of 1962, as Amended, Vol. 4 (6) Mediterranean J. Soc. Sci. (2013), http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/viewFile/313/329 (accessed 31 Aug.
2017).
61 E.g. ‘Meyerowitz v CIR (1963 AD) 25 SATC 287, dealt with the concept of abnormality, in Hicklin v SIR (1980 AD) 41 SATC 179 it was decided that where persons are
acting at arms length there is a presumption that any rights and obligations created between them are normal and because the element of abnormality was not present the
GAAR could not apply. In CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (1999) 61 SATC 391, the substance of an arrangement and the true intention of the parties was examined and it was
found that the scheme was not a “sham” transaction and although tax was saved this did not turn it into an abnormal transaction’.
62 West & Roeleveld, supra n. 47, at 617–618.
63 See s. 2.2, supra. Pistone, supra n. 40, at 170 and Piantavigna, supra n. 42.
64 The use of GAARs to tackle aggressive tax planning will be addressed in the 2018 IFA Seoul Congress. Subject 1 which deals with Anti-avoidance measures of general
nature and scope. GAAR and other rules.
65 An example will be the use of beneficial ownership instead of the limitation on benefits provision. In this case, the requirements for beneficial ownership can be less
restrictive than the requirements of limitation on benefits.
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individuals, it being considered that companies have more
resources and more room for tax planning than indivi-
duals. The Brazilian tax authorities challenge not only the
interpretation of the tax legislation but also the character-
ization of a legal relationship as described by the
taxpayer.66
Another example is the South African GAAR which
appears to target schemes characteristic of ATP (whether
domestic or cross border). The GAAR, in considering whether
a scheme lacks commercial substance,67 will find indicative
schemes which include roundtrip financing schemes68 or the
presence of an accommodating or tax indifferent party69 in the
arrangement. In the past, both such factors were implicitly
considered in the application of GAAR, but the new GAAR
explicitly identifies such practices as lacking commercial sub-
stance adding to the likelihood of the scheme being an
impermissible tax avoidance scheme.
3.2.2 Disclosure Obligations by the Taxpayer and/or
Tax Adviser
Another issue that was also addressed in this survey was the
existence or not of measures targeting tax consultants in the
surveyed countries. Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay and South
Africa do not have rules to target tax consultants; however,
in Uruguay the behaviour of the consultantmay be punishable
if such behaviour is qualified as an offence or crime. In South
Africa, the Tax Administration Act has a section dealing with
unprofessional conduct (Chapter 18 section 239 to 243). In
addition, the Act also includes rules to ensure that tax
practitioners are registered with reputable bodies (section
240(1)). The situation may change due to the introduction
of BEPS Action 12 that provides for disclosure of tax arrange-
ments by tax consultants.70
Successful application of GAAR is reliant, in part, on the
disclosure by the taxpayer of the tax scheme disclosed by the
taxpayer to the tax authorities and on the analysis by the tax
administration of the tax scheme to assess whether it consti-
tutes unacceptable tax avoidance or ATP. It is submitted that
clear and consistent disclosure requirements equally provide
clarity for the taxpayer as to the application of the GAAR. In
addition, early disclosure or advanced disclosure of transac-
tions prior to the end of a year of assessment may also mitigate
against or better enforce the application of the GAAR.
However, in this respect it appears that the surveyed countries
may have to improve their domestic disclosure and room
exists for the development of general disclosure rules concern-
ing potentially ATP schemes (see also section 5 below).
With respect to potential ATP schemes, companies in
South Africa are subject to disclosure requirements in
respect of certain71 reportable arrangements.72 The mirror
of the language with that of the GAAR provides clear
evidence that such disclosure is geared at early identifica-
tion of a potential aggressive tax scheme and provides
further guidance of impermissible tax avoidance.
In contrast with respect to potential ATP schemes,
Colombia73 and Uruguay only have disclosure require-
ments in respect of transfer pricing.74 While Brazil
requires companies to maintain and furnish all accounting
information to the tax administration,75 there are no
Notes
66 It is argued that challenging the legal relationship became usual in the sport business after sportsmen managed to incorporate legal entities to enjoy corporate taxation on a
deemed income basis. See L. E. Schoueri, Taxation of High Net Worth Sports Persons in Brazil, 2 Global Sports L. & Tax’n Reports, 9–12 (2011). In the Felipão case (Judgment
106-14.244 of 10 Oct. 2004) and Guga case (Judgment 106-17.147 of 5 Nov. 2008), the Brazilian Administrative Council of Tax Appeals (Conselho Administrativo de Recursos
Fiscais CARF) disregarded the structure under the argument that the legal entity would only intend to cover personal services rendered. After the tax planning as such was
authorized by legislation in 2005, challenges started to question the nature of the payments received instead of the structure itself. In the Neymar case (Judgment 2402-
005.703 of 15 Mar. 2017), a legal entity incorporated to exploit image rights had income attributed to the individual taxpayer since paid after ‘pre-established percentages’
without ‘relation to the effective exploitation of the right’.
67 S. 80C of the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
68 S. 80D of the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
69 S. 80E of the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
70 For instance, at the IFA Latin-American Congress that took place in May/June 2017 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the application of BEPS Action 12 in Latin American
countries was discussed and some differences in approach towards the disclosure of tax arrangement by tax consultants were noted. See General Report Alejandro Messineo.
General Report and country reports available at the website of IFA Latin-American at http://apps.kingconf.com/ifa2017indice/ (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
71 Latest notice (3 Feb. 2016) found at: http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/SecLegis/LAPD-LSec-TAdm-PN-2016-02%20-%20Notice%20140%20GG%2039650%
203%20February%202016.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
72 The arrangement will be reportable if a ‘tax benefit’ is derived and (1) the calculation of interest is dependent on the tax treatment of the arrangement; (2) the inclusion or
presence of round trip financing or an accommodating or a tax indifferent party or it contains elements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other; (3) gives rise
to an amount disclosed as a deduction for income tax but not as an expense for purposes of ‘financial reporting standards’ or revenue for ‘financial reporting standards’ but not
as gross income for purposes of the Income Tax Act; (4) does not result in a reasonable expectation of a ‘pre-tax profit’ for any ‘participant’; (5) results in a reasonable
expectation of a ‘pre-tax profit’ for any ‘participant’ that is less than the value of the tax benefit where both are discounted to present value at the end of the year of
assessment.
73 The 2012 Tax Reform Colombia established new disclosure obligations related to transfer pricing for all transactions involving the transfer of a Colombian asset to foreign
jurisdictions, regardless of whether the transaction involves related parties or if it is valued at a price that does not exceed the minimum threshold for transfer pricing
reporting.
74 Transfer pricing will be discussed in another forthcoming (2018) article in the framework of the DeSTaT project.
75 Since 2007, a major Public Digital Bookkeeping System (Sistema Público de Escrituração Digital SPED) runs the reception and storage of numerous books and documents.
SPED comprises electronic versions of (1) financial statements and tax returns (uploaded annually for purposes of the corporate income tax), (2) tax records as the entry, exit
and inventory books (uploaded monthly for purposes of the federal excise tax and state sales tax), and (3) invoices registering sales and services performed. Under SPED,
information that was previously provided to federal, state and local tax authorities, in physical and separate documents, is provided in standardized and electronic files. The
system is administered by the Federal Revenue Service, and is easily accessible by state and municipal authorities upon conclusion of an agreement. SPED integrates the
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specific rules regarding the disclosure by the taxpayer of
tax planning schemes.76
From a tax policy perspective, the differences in approach
towards disclosure needs to be revisited by the surveyed
countries. Requirements for disclosure by the taxpayer of
ATP may benefit the tax administration and the taxpayer
since on the one hand, the tax administration will receive
information on how the taxpayer operates, and on the other
hand, the taxpayer could receive a consultative ruling stating
whether the tax administration has concerns that such struc-
ture can result in ATP. Such a consultative (non-binding)
ruling enables the taxpayer to discuss any concerns the tax
administration may have with the tax structure. Such an
approach requires a certain level of trust between the autho-
rities and the taxpayer. Should such a structure be applied but
the taxpayer experiences an increase in tax audits or the tax
administration become confrontational with respect to the
consultative rulings, the system may fail. Such concerns
should be addressed by the OECD when dealing with the
implementation of BEPS Action 12 that provides for disclo-
sure of aggressive tax schemes.
In respect of GAAR, we argue that it is important to
have clear and simple rules as to the application of GAAR
to ATP schemes. The failure to approve the statutory
GAAR in Brazil and the lack of clarity in Uruguay on
whether the behaviour is regarded as a tax offence or not,
are inconsistent with the objectives of fiscal transparency.
4 FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE
OF INFORMATION TO TACKLE AGGRESSIVE
TAX PLANNING IN THE COUNTRIES
OF RESEARCH
4.1 Introduction to Fiscal Transparency
Dharmapala77 expresses the concern that global fiscal
transparency is less effective in preventing sophisticated
corporate ATP activity as opposed to evasion-related
activities carried out by individuals in tax havens.
While this may currently be true, the increased network
of exchange of information instruments and the growing
automatic exchange of information may start to chal-
lenge this view. It is clear, however, both in terms of
the foregoing sections of this article and the evidence
from the surveyed countries below that in the absence of
early disclosure procedures or a mechanism to collect
relevant data to flag potential schemes, it is likely that
the necessary information will not be easily apparent to
the tax administration relegating exchange of informa-
tion to a tool of last resort rather than a proactive
measure.
The surveyed countries cannot confirm the since the
instruments for exchange of information have only been
recently implemented by them. An extension of informa-
tion to be supplied (and increased penalties for non-dis-
closure) in the annual return to be submitted by corporate
taxpayers may also be a deterrent to aggressive tax
schemes.
Mere exchange of information is not enough to tackle
ATP, as financial or tax information from a different
jurisdiction may initially only reveal underreporting of
income or hidden assets. However, an enhanced exchange
of information where the administration gets data on the
taxpayers’ uncertain tax positions, or their use of domestic
benefits may be more effective in tackling ATP. Similarly,
and especially for the developing countries, the use of
joint audit or other co-operative techniques between tax
administrations are not yet sufficiently developed or uti-
lized to be an effective tool against ATP.
The situation is changing as countries are not only
exchanging information on request,78 but since 2014 a
new global standard i.e. automatic exchange has been
introduced. The surveyed countries have committed to
adopt the global standard by 2017, i.e. Colombia and
South Africa, or by 2018, i.e. Brazil and Uruguay.
These countries will have access to financial account
information that in addition to the country by country
reporting (BEPS Action 13) will allow the tax admin-
istrations to have access to more information on an
automatic basis.
Despite the access to more information, we submit that
the concern of Dharmapala on the effectiveness of
exchange of information to tackle ATP still remains
unanswered. The reason is that countries are still at the
early stages of implementing automatic exchange of infor-
mation and exchange of country by country reporting, and
Notes
management of tax obligations in a national level, with timely exchange of sensitive information between tax administrations. L. E. Schoueri & M. C. Barbosa, Brazil, in Tax
Secrecy and Tax Transparency: The Relevance of Confidentiality in Tax Law, vol. 1, 169–208 (E. Kristoffersson et al., Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH 2013).
76 Government introduced a Provisional Measure (No. 685) in 2015 attempting to oblige taxpayers to report transactions involving elimination, reduction or deferral of taxes.
Should authorities disagree with the relevant transaction, the taxpayer would be summoned to pay taxes due (and interest) within thirty days. The lack of declaration entailed
a presumption of fraud, with a penalty of 150%. The rule identified reportable transactions after general notions like ‘relevant reasons other than tax’ or ‘typical contract’. In
the lack of an applicable GAAR and deviating from BEPS Action 12 itself, the proposed disclosure was not clear with respect to what should be reported by taxpayers. As
the previous Provisional Measure No. 66, the Provisional Measure No. 685 was eventually rejected by Parliament.
77 D. Dharmapala, Presentation: Tax Havens and the Economic Perspective at the Executive Training Seminar Series: Tax Havens: Selected Theoretical and Practical Key
Issues. A Legal and Economic Perspective (June 2011). Organized by the Academy of Global Governance. European University Institute.
78 All surveyed countries i.e. Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and South Africa are members of the OECD Global Transparency Forum. All countries have been reviewed in phase 1
and 2 by the Peer Review Group. Colombia and South Africa are compliant whereas Brazil, and Uruguay are largely compliant with the OECD Standard on Exchange of
Information. The Peer Review Group examines the legal and regulatory framework for exchange and the exchange of information in practice. Information available http://
www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchange-of-information-on-request/peer-review/ (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
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therefore, it is too early to test the effectiveness of
exchange of information.79
4.2 Access to International Databases
The tax administration of the countries may have access to
international databases such as the OECD database on ATP
schemes (ATP Directory)80 and the database run by the
OECD Joint International Taskforce on Shared Intelligence
and Collaboration (JITSIC).81 The JITSIC is a Centre cre-
ated in 2014 by the OECD and open on a voluntary basis
to all members of the OECD’s Forum on Tax
Administration. From the countries belonging to the
Forum i.e. Brazil, Colombia and South Africa, only South
Africa has become a member of the JITSIC. Uruguay is not
a member of the OECD Forum on Tax administration nor
of the JITSIC.
However, even where it can be confirmed that the tax
administration has access to such databases, for example
Colombia has access to the OECD reports on ATP and South
Africa has joined JITSEC, there is no information in the public
domain as to the use or application of these databases by the tax
authorities of the surveyed countries. No information is avail-
able on what mechanisms the tax authorities may be using or
which international databases are being accessed by the Tax
Authorities to identify tax shelters or ATP.
4.3 International Task Forces and Regional
Initiatives
Tax authorities of a country may be party to any formal or
informal international task force to counter ATP. The
developments have taken place at international (OECD)
level but also at regional level. However, participation in
international task forces and regional initiatives varies
from country to country. The varying participation is
indicative of a lack of international co-ordination or a
lack of faith with respect to the success of the initiative.
It is further unclear, even where there is stated participa-
tion, as to the level of commitment to the initiative.
The surveyed countries provide clear evidence of such
varying participation. Colombia, Brazil and South Africa,
for example, participate in OECD initiatives with the aim
to strengthen the tax administration (the OECD Tax
Inspector Without Borders initiative). Another example
is the participation of Colombia, Brazil, South Africa, and
Uruguay in OECD initiatives and regional initiatives to
counter ATP (regional agreements that contribute to
facilitate joint audits and simultaneous audits) and to
exchange information (Common Reporting Standard
which introduced the global standard on Automatic
Exchange of Information).
The level of engagement in international task forces
and regional initiatives may depend on the motivation
behind such participation. South Africa is, for example,
a significant force in regional bodies such as the South
African Development Community (SADC) and the
African Tax Administrators Forum (ATAF). From such
engagement, South Africa has also expanded to other fora.
Examples include being one of the driving forces82 of Tax
Inspectors Without Borders.83 Furthermore,84 the regio-
nal multilateral agreement of SADC will most certainly
facilitate future joint audits85 and simultaneous tax
examinations.86 Since May 2007, South Africa has an
‘enhanced engagement’ with the OECD. Furthermore,
Notes
79 The issue of exchange of information and taxpayer rights and the issue of simultaneous tax examinations and joint audits will be dealt with in other articles in the framework
of the DeSTaT project. See for exchange of information I. J. Mosquera Valderrama, A. Mazz, L. E. Schoueri, N. Quiñones, J. Roeleveld, P. Pistone & F. Zimmer, The Rule of
Law and the Effective Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights in Developing Countries (31 Aug. 2017). WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2017-10. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034360 (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
80 According to the OECD: ‘The ATP Directory is a secure database of aggressive tax planning schemes. Access to the databases is limited to government officials from
countries that are members of the Expert Group on ATP Directory. The Directory contains a database of more than 400 tax planning schemes and a section on hybrid
mismatch arrangements with tables that compare the tax treatment of entities and instruments in various countries in order to facilitate the detection of hybrid mismatch
arrangements’. Information available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/co-operation-and-exchange-of-information-on-atp.htm (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
81 In 2014, the OECD introduced the Joint International Tax Shelter Information and Collaboration Centre (2014). ‘The main objective of this Centre is to offer a platform to
enable its members to actively collaborate within the legal framework of effective bilateral and multilateral conventions and tax information exchange agreements – sharing
their experience, resources and expertise to tackle the issues they face in common’ The OECD stated that this initiative builds on the success of the original JITSIC.
Therefore, ‘the member countries agreed to establish the JITSIC Network, with a wider focus on information exchange and collaboration on areas of common concern.
Reflecting this change, JITSIC was renamed as the Joint International Tax Shelter Information & Collaboration Network’. http://www.oecd.org/tax/forum-on-tax-
administration/jitsic/ (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).The original initiative was the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC) established in 2004 by the
governments of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States to combat cross-border avoidance.Information available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/+/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/avoidance/aag-jitsic.htm (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
82 The driving forces behind the OECD initiative of ‘Tax Inspectors without Borders’ were ‘Oupa Magashula, former Commissioner General of the South Africa Revenue
Service, Nhlanhla Nene, then South Africa’s Deputy Finance Minister and Pascal Saint-Amans, Director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration’.
83 OECD (2012), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/taxoecdlaunchestaxinspectorswithoutborders.htm (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
84 See J. Roeleveld & C. West, South Africa, in Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation Between Tax Authorities vol. 98b, 19–20 (IFA Cahiers, Online Books IBFD
2013).
85 According to the OECD a joint audit (JA) ‘means an arrangement whereby Participating Countries agree to conduct a coordinated audit of one or more related taxable
persons (both legal entities and individuals) where the audit focus has a common or complementary interest and/or transaction. A JA shall include at least two or more
Participating Countries’ Sixth Meeting OECD Forum on Tax Administration. Istanbul 15 and 16 Sept. 2010. Joint Audits Participants Guide. Available at http://www.
oecd.org/tax/administration/45988962.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
86 According to the OECD simultaneous tax examination ‘means an arrangement between two or more Parties to examine simultaneously and independently, each on its own
territory, the tax affairs of (a) taxpayer(s) in which they have a common or related interest, with a view to exchanging any relevant information which they so obtain’. 1992
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South Africa has been extensively involved in the
OECD’s Forum for Tax Administration; co-chaired the
joint OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs and
Development Assistance Committee; and it is a member
of the G20 nation. In addition, South Africa has signed
the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters, which entered into force in March 2014
and has been involved in a number of reports generated
by these bodies in the area of exchange of information
and cross border cooperation between tax authorities.
This involvement has also aided the improvements to
the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the
increased involvement of South Africa in international
trade.
Colombia provides further evidence of a country
engaging in international task forces and regional activ-
ity. While currently having observer status in the
OECD, Colombia is in the accession process to become
an OECD Member. Demonstrating its commitment,
Colombia participates actively in the working parties
of the OECD, especially Working Parties 1 and 6 at
the OECD. Colombia also participates in a number of
regional initiatives. In this regard, Colombia aims to
exchange information with countries of the Pacific
Alliance (Peru, Chile, Mexico and Colombia), and
with members of the Andean Community in the frame-
work of the Decision 578 (Multilateral tax treaty model
of the Andean Community). The exchange of informa-
tion may result also in the exchange of aggressive tax
practices experienced by the tax administration of
Colombia, especially in the framework of the
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters, which entered into force in July 2014.
While the tax administration has not disclosed any
public information regarding this practice, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the CIAT (Inter-American
Center of Tax Administration87) meetings may involve
an informal exchange of information regarding notor-
ious audits and abusive schemes.
Like Colombia, Brazil seeks to join the OECD and has
recently (May 2017) sent a formal request to become a
member of the OECD. Brazil is a member of the G20
nations and has been involved in several OECD initiatives
such as the Global Forum on Exchange of Information and
Transparency for Tax Purposes and the Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which
entered into force in October 2016. Uruguay has not
expressed its interest to become an OECD member, but
it participates in several OECD initiatives including the
Global Forum on Exchange of Information and
Transparency for Tax Purposes and the Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which
entered into force also in December 2016.
5 AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING
AND CO-OPERATIVE TAX COMPLIANCE
Many of the measures discussed in this article to counter
ATP rely, in part, on a sound working relationship
between the taxpayer and the tax authorities. Indeed, it
may be argued that in the absence of a sound and trans-
parent relationship between the parties, the measures put
in place against ATP may well fail.
The approach to a sound relationship between tax
administration and taxpayer is not new. In 2008, the
OECD encouraged tax administrations to establish a rela-
tionship with large business taxpayers based on trust and
co-operation; the so-called ‘enhanced relationship’.88
Later, in 2013, the OECD decided to include the term
co-operative compliance to make clear ‘that the approach
is based on co-operation with the purposes of assuring
compliance, which is to say payment of the right amount
of tax at the right time’.89
Co-operative tax compliance between taxpayers and tax
authorities should be high on the priority of any tax
administration.90 Transparency between tax authorities
and taxpayers leads to certainty in the disclosure require-
ments, application and interpretation of the law and,
Notes
OECD Model Agreement for the Undertaking of Simultaneous Tax Examinations. Available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/2666483.pdf (accessed
31 Aug. 2017).
87 According to the website of the CIAT, ‘the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT) supports the efforts of national governments by promoting the evolution,
social acceptance and institutional strengthening of tax administrations, encouraging international cooperation and the exchange of experiences and best practices’.
Information available at http://www.ciat.org/index.php/en/about-ciat.html (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
88 OECD, supra n. 31.
89 See OECD, Co-operative Compliance: A Framework: From Enhanced Relationship to Co-operative Compliance 13 (Paris, OECD Publishing 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264200852-en (accessed 31 Aug. 2017). See for the most recent OECD report on this topic, OECD, Co-operative Tax Compliance: Building Better Tax Control Frameworks
(Paris, OECD Publishing 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264253384-en (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).Co-operative compliance and developing countries will be
addressed in another article in the framework of the DeSTaT project (Forthcoming 2018). See for cooperative compliance J. L. Pemberton & A. Majdańska, Can
Cooperative Compliance Help Developing Countries Address the Challenges of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative?, 70 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 10 (2016), Journals
IBFD. See also (in Spanish) J. A. Rozas Valdés, Los Sistemas de Relaciones Cooperativas: Una perspectiva de Derecho Comparado desde el Sistema Tributario Español, Instituto de
Estudios Fiscales. Document no. 6.2016.
90 In Feb. 2011, the OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs published a report on Tackling Aggressive Tax Planning Through Improved Transparency and Disclosure. This report
outlined the importance of timely, targeted and comprehensive information to counter aggressive tax planning. This report also provided an overview of disclosure initiatives
introduced in certain OECD countries and the usefulness of such initiatives for both taxpayers and tax administrations. One of the main conclusions of this report is that
‘disclosure initiatives can help to fill the gap between the creation/promotion of aggressive tax planning schemes and their identification by the tax authorities’. This report
recommended ‘to countries to continue sharing experiences on the design and implementation of disclosure initiatives to assist in creating a compliance framework that
benefits both governments and taxpayers at large’. OECD, Tackling Aggressive Tax Planning Through Improved Transparency and Disclosure 19 (OECD Publishing 2011), Report
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/48322860.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
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where extended to co-operation cross-border, consistency
in the information and the penalties levied against non-
compliance.
The surveyed countries represent a proxy for the current
state of this relationship, for ATP, between taxpayers and
tax authorities.
To date, the main objective of the tax authorities has
been the extent to which information is available or to be
made available to them. The focus has not been on trans-
parency in terms of availability of clear and reliable rules
for the taxpayers.
In Brazil, there is currently poor communication
between the Brazilian Revenue Service (BRS) and the
taxpayers pursuant to the interpretation of the tax legisla-
tion. Critically a difficulty in obtaining a consolidated
position of the BRS as regards controversial issues exists.
A previous mechanism to obtain ‘normative opinions’ was
repealed. Coupled with the inefficiency of the consulting
process before the BRS has resulted in a breakdown of the
relationship between the tax authority and the taxpayer.
In an attempt to rectify this breakdown, the Normative
Ruling No. 1396 of 2013 assigned authority to the gen-
eral Coordination of the Taxation Body (Coordenação-Geral
de Tributação Cosit) power to answer questions addressed
to the BRS by means of a consultative ruling, which
answer binds the tax administration. These consultative
rulings must be published on the website of the BRS
(apart from specific data relating to the identification of
the taxpayer, such as process number, cadastral data, etc.).
Publication of the relevant answers allows rulings to be
claimed as a precedent by taxpayers in similar situations.
Equally, in Colombia, taxpayers do not fully trust the
tax administration. This lack of trust has prevented the
development of a proactive enhanced cooperation for the
tax system of Colombia. The only existing tool which may
be seen as supportive of enhanced cooperation is the use of
Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs) between the tax-
payer and the tax administration in issues of transfer
pricing. Before the 2012 Tax Reform, only one APA
had been concluded,91 and as of now (August 2017),
only three more applications are being processed by the
tax administration. The 2012 reform sought to encourage
the use of APAs and the validity of these APAs was
extended and changed to be applicable to the year for
which it is requested, the year before, and the following
three years.92 Whether these changes to the APA regime
are effective in enhancing the relationship between the tax
administration and the taxpayers is not yet assessed, but
the fact that the lack of trained personnel leads to possible
breaches of the Chinese wall between the audit and APA
teams remains as a barrier towards the effectiveness of this
measure.
The South African tax authority lists as a key objective
the development of an enhanced relationship between
itself and other tax authorities, and with corporate tax-
payers. In an attempt to enhance transparency as to the
interpretation of the tax law, the tax authority publishes
interpretation notes (which may be relied on by the
taxpayer). Further general guidance is given in the form
of guides and media releases, but these do not have the
force of law. In addition, South Africa has introduced an
advance tax ruling regime93 aiming to provide some
certainty regarding a proposed transaction or scheme.
However, the types of transactions for which these rulings
may be sought severely restricts this regime. Despite these
various forms of guidance, the legislation is frequently
amended where the tax administration finds the outcome
of tax cases unfavourable. Such a stance, while justifiable
in some instances, does not provide certainty, clarity or
reliability on tax rules.
Two mechanisms to enhance transparency and the
relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers
exist in Uruguay. A binding tax inquiry regime, laid
down in Article 71 to 74 of the Tax Code, permits a
taxpayer having a personal and direct interest to ask the
tax administration for the application of legislation
specified in the inquiry to an existing transaction.
Alternatively, the taxpayer may make use of the
advanced pricing regime (APAs) for transfer pricing
issues (Article 44bis of the Income Tax on Economic
Activities (IRAE)).94 An APA under this regime is up
to three fiscal years, providing certainty and reliability
on the ruling.
The Brazilian and the South African positions show
that more instruments to give certainty to the taxpayer
on the tax consequences of their transactions do not
necessarily result in a better relationship between the tax
administration and the taxpayer. Often the interpretation
and position of the tax administration is not always avail-
able to the public i.e. other taxpayers than the ones
involved in the ruling, creating an atmosphere of distrust
between the taxpayers and the tax authorities and the
perceptions of unfair tax practices. For most of these
countries it is too early to establish whether these initia-
tives have been successful to tackle ATP and to enhance
Notes
91 Introductory note to the Law 1607 of 2012.
92 Art. 260 (10) Colombian Tax Code.
93 Ch. 7 (ss 75 to 90) of the Tax Administration Act (TAA) No. 28 of 2011.
94 The APA instrument was introduced by Decree 392/2009 (Art. 314 of Law 18996 granted legal status to the APA provisions), which states that the Uruguayan General Tax
Bureau (GTB) may execute APAs with taxpayers, which must be signed before performing the transactions under analysis and that may not exceed the term of the three
following fiscal years from which the APA was signed. The term will be applicable to financial years closing after the year in which this regime comes into force. Information
available at International Transfer Pricing 2013/2014 PWC at 862. http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/international-transfer-pricing/assets/uruguay.pdf (accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
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more compliance by the companies engaged in tax plan-
ning arrangements.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Following the comparative overview of the GAARs and
enhanced relationships in the surveyed countries it is
apparent that the surveyed countries need to not only
exchange information but also enhance the standard of
fiscal transparency, including availability, clarity, simpli-
city and reliability of the anti-avoidance rules and to
improve the relationship between the taxpayers and the
tax administration.
The measures taken by the selected countries are not
currently consistent with this standard of fiscal transpar-
ency. The implementation of anti-avoidance measures is
inconsistent and depends on the use and interpretation of
anti-avoidance rules by the tax administration and judi-
ciary. Furthermore, the application of the anti-avoidance
rules to ATP is yet to be determined. Further detrimental
to fiscal transparency and enhanced taxpayer-tax authority
relationships is the example of Brazil where the tax admin-
istration has decided to use (without any legal basis) the
business purpose doctrine. While mainly due to the lack of
regulation (ordinary law) that is necessary for the imple-
mentation of the doctrine of sham/simulation in the
Brazilian Tax Code, such application is damaging to the
system, transparency and the tax authority’s relationship
with taxpayers. This position is exacerbated by contradic-
tory decisions given by the Brazilian Administrative
Council of Tax Appeals (Conselho Administrativo de Recursos
Fiscais CARF) regarding tax treatment of investment made
directly through controlled foreign companies.
The scope of application of the anti-avoidance rules of
abuse of law and substance over form has been left to the
tax administration in Colombia, rendering them unclear
and failing in the standards of transparency. In Uruguay,
the tax administration has applied the substance over form
doctrine to tax avoidance, and also to tax evasion cases
which is not in accordance with the intention of the
legislator when introducing the substance over form doc-
trine. In South Africa, the tax administration only has the
case law dealing with the old anti-avoidance rule even
though a new anti-avoidance rule (section 80A to 80L
Income Tax Act) was introduced in 2006.
From a tax policy perspective, it is submitted that the
countries have struggled to find the right balance between
the introduction of tax measures to tackle ATP and the
introduction of transparent measures that provide clarity
and reliability for the taxpayer.
While anti-avoidance rules and related instruments
developed by the tax administration to interpret such
rules exist, significant uncertainty remains for the taxpayer
regarding the implementation and interpretation of
GAARs by the tax administration. The lack of consistency
in the application of anti-avoidance rules (Uruguay),
reference to the case law pertaining to an old anti-avoidance
rule for the application of a new anti-avoidance rule (South
Africa), the broad scope of interpretation left to the tax
administration (Colombia), the use of an anti-avoidance
rule without legislative basis (Brazil) require clarification.
It follows from the research carried out in section 3 that
there is always an element of subjectivity with respect to the
application of a GAAR as its very nature requires analysis of
the scheme on a case-by-case basis, but the broad implica-
tions of a classification in a category of avoidance should be
transparent to the taxpayer (see section 3.2 above).
In this context, this article argues that individual states
should clarify the application of the anti-avoidance rules,
through further legislation or administrative regulation,
as the current application has been demonstrated to be
uncertain and unclear for taxpayers. Taxpayers cannot be
expected to gain certainty based on the (subjective) appli-
cation by the tax administration, and/or the interpretation
by judges on a case by case basis. We submit that even
though the GAAR should be drafted generally, the lack of
rules to clarify the application of the GAAR may create
uncertainty and/or court disputes.
Finally, from a tax policy perspective, it can be observed
that in the surveyed countries, there is a hierarchical relation-
ship between taxpayer and tax administration and a lack of
disclosure of ATP arrangements. South Africa may be a
counterpoint to this conclusion when considering its repor-
table arrangements legislation. Consultative (non-binding)
tax rulings, whereby the taxpayer and the tax administration
can discuss the tax treatment and the application of GAAR
to specific tax arrangements, may be an avenue to provide
greater certainty and clarity to the taxpayer – provided such
rulings are consistent and transparent (i.e. disclosed in
redacted form). However, such an approach rests on the
successful development of an enhanced relationship based
on mutual trust and legitimate expectations between the
taxpayer and the tax administration.
6.1 Recommendations
To achieve transparency in respect of ATP, anti-avoidance
rules should be available to and clear for the tax administra-
tion to enforce consistently to provide the taxpayer bound-
aries in the application on which the taxpayer may rely. To
achieve clarity in the application of the GAAR, it is recom-
mended that mechanisms are put in place to enhance the
relationship between the taxpayer and the tax administra-
tion. This can be partly achieved in offering consultative
(non-binding) rulings through which the taxpayer can
request the tax administration for its views of a specific
transaction. The taxpayer should be able to disclose tax
planning arrangements without fearing any risk of penalties
upon disclosure. This consultative ruling should also allow
the tax administration to assess in advance whether those
arrangements would be considered as ATP or not. The tax
administration should also be able to express the likelihood
of the application of the GAAR to the disclosed / proposed
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transaction. Even though such rulings would not be binding,
the taxpayer would be forewarned with respect to the tax
authority view. Such advance knowledge may shape taxpayer
behaviour to reduce tax planning perceived as aggressive.
Bentley supports such systems, stating that ‘the prolifera-
tion of ruling regimes provides a significant source of assis-
tance to taxpayers in the assessment process, particularly in
relation to complex or uncertain areas of the tax law’.95 This
recommendation does bear the caveat that an appropriate
level of trust must be created between the tax authorities and
the taxpayer, but such ruling may assist in this regard and,
secondly, that the rulings issued should be published.
Another way to obtain more certainty is by means of
horizontal supervision which is based on trust and trans-
parency and where the tax authorities are prepared to
respond to the taxpayer’s need for certainty by signing an
agreement between the tax administration and the tax-
payer. This horizontal supervision requires from the tax-
payer to be completely transparent and not to be engaged
in ATP. As rightly stated by Gribnau, horizontal monitor-
ing could contribute to taxpayers moving away from ATP
towards tax risk management96 and certainty.97
In developing co-operative compliance to deal with
ATP, the role that tax consultants could play should
also be considered. Tax consultants could be used in a
consultative capacity. Alternatively, or in addition, tax
consultants could, in a trusting relationship, provide
input to the tax administration of particularly ATP
schemes. However, such engagement requires a non-
adversarial and trusting relationship between the tax
administration, tax consultant and, the taxpayer. It is
submitted that the use of advanced tax rulings, horizontal
monitoring, and disclosure requirements for all tax plan-
ning arrangements could help the tax administration
monitor ATP. Furthermore, these instruments could pro-
vide taxpayers with greater transparency in terms of avail-
ability, clarity, and reliability on the tax consequences of
their tax planning arrangements.
Notes
95 D. Bentley, The Rise of ‘Soft Law’ in Tax Administration - Good News for Taxpayers?, Vol. 33 (1) Asia-Pacific Tax Bull.(2008).
96 In order to address the tax risks the 2013 and 2016 OECD reports on Co-operative Compliance introduced tax control frameworks. See s. 5 supra. Co-operative compliance
will be addressed in a forthcoming (2018) article in the framework of the DeSTaT project.
97 This is the case for instance in the Netherlands as argued by Gribnau For Gribnau, this change of attitude by the multinationals is mainly due to horizontal monitoring that
means that, on ‘the basis of trust and transparency, the tax authorities are prepared to respond to the multinationals’ need for certainty’. See H. Gribnau, Soft Law and
Taxation: The Case of the Netherlands, 3 Legisprudence 325 (2007).
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